The intricate web Man City spun to con the Premier League

"To cheat, trick, deceive, delude with false pretences; to impose upon, take in, hoax."

That is the Oxford English definition of the word "sham".

And that word appears eight times in the independent commission's ruling published on Tuesday, which found Manchester City guilty of all charges related to serious breaches of financial rules, and all but one in relation to a failure to co-operate with the investigation.

The 40-page document makes fascinating reading.

It catalogues how the club's owners, Abu Dhabi United Group, knew from the 2009-10 season that there would be major overspends if the club was to reach the level they wanted to get to.

So, the ruling says, City found a way to boost sponsorship income. Season, after season, after season.

For nine seasons, in fact.

The report shows how the club's owners were topping up the value of the deals.

The so-called Disguised Funding Scheme is the central plank in a series of charges that Manchester City have been found guilty of by the Premier League.

This scheme managed to hide more than £830m of sponsorship funding, while other devices hid £90m in expenses.

We break down the key findings from the document.

The problem became apparent very quickly for the new owners

Manchester City were bought by Abu Dhabi investors in 2008 but, the document says, their predicament had become clear from the start of the 2009-10 season.

These were ambitious new owners who did not just want the club to be competitive. They wanted to have the best players and be winners.

That was not going to be possible without spending more money. And lots of it.

Total losses for the 2009-10 campaign were going to exceed what was, at that time, the record single-season financial loss by a Premier League member club. That was Chelsea FC in 2006, of £140m.

According to the ruling, that was a record that the City owners were adamant the club should not break

The club knew they would likely continue to suffer large losses for at least the following five seasons.

This was when both Uefa and the Premier League were about to bring in financial fair play rules.

This was clearly going to be a problem.

To address this the only option was to significantly increase commercial revenue - and reduce the reliance on their owners.

Sham contracts and the disguised funding scheme

In early 2010, Manchester City took the first steps to get the additional funding into the club.

City would enter into sponsorship agreements which were record amounts and were significantly above fair market value.

It is referred to as the 'disguised funding scheme'.

This is how it worked, according to the ruling.

The sponsorship deals were split into two parts: a base fee, and a tagged sum.

The sponsors would pay the base fee.

And the club's owners would pay the tagged sum.

Ergo, the sponsors would not have to pay the full value of the contract. The club's owners would pay the vast majority, which enabled them to invest in players.

This, the document states, "gave the misleading impression to third parties (including regulators and its auditors) in its financial statements and any required FFP returns that its commercial revenues from sponsorship agreements were far, far greater than was in fact the case".

But the club also knew they had to be nimble.

From time to time the disguised funding scheme would be tweaked to "assist with continued concealment" and "reduce the likelihood of difficult questions being asked".

What did this all mean in reality?

Commercial income from sponsors totalled £949.94m in the seasons from 2009-10 to 2017-18.

The ruling says only £119.25 million represented base fees.

A total of £830.69 million represented tagged sums - the amount paid by the club's owners.

Man City have denied the claims and say the Premier League had misunderstood the sponsorship agreements.

However, the panel said it "rejected that explanation as untrue".

It said it was "concocted well after the event in an attempt to obscure and conceal the realities of the disguised funding scheme".

An example given of the disguised funding scheme in action: plugging an unexpected shortfall in May 2013.

Less than a week before the end of that 2012-13 financial year the club knew they were £9.9m short of complying with Uefa's financial rules.

In a matter of days, without sponsors even being approached, a number of modified sponsor agreements were generated which increased recorded sponsorship fees to pay bonuses for events that had already taken place and to pay for a US tour.